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CURRENT STATUS OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS' RIGHT TO INDEMNIFICATION
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. *
IN these days when profits are hypertrophied and business
leaders have, at least for a time, ceased to be objects of suspi-
cion and aversion, a director of a large corporation is a person of
considerable magnificence. But corporate eminence, like other
types, has its perils. The director's sword of Damocles is the indi-
vidual liability to which he almost inevitably exposes himself
when he assumes the responsibility of managing a large aggrega-
tion of other people's capital, thereby affecting in a variety of ways
the interests of other business organizations, government, and the
public.
The most discussed type of such liability is that resulting from
a creditor's or minority stockholder's derivative suit against di-
rectors ' for asserted mismanagement or waste of the corporate
assets. Recent business history suggests that such liability may
assume alarming proportions. To take an outstanding example,
the cost of resisting a vigorous effort by outsiders to seize control,
carried on with modern high-pressure techniques of proxy fight-
ing, may easily run into six, and even seven, figures.' If, at the
suit of a minority stockholder, it should ultimately be held im-
proper to pay such expenses out of the corporate till -and, in
the present state of the law, no director or his counsel can predict
* Member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars. A.B., Dartmouth,
1936; LL.B., Harvard, 1940.
' The position of corporate officers and employees is, in the situations considered
in this article, substantially similar to that of directors. For the sake of simplicity,
most references will be to directors, but what is said about them is generally ap-
plicable to the others.
The total costs of one recent proxy fight for control of a fairly large corpora-
tion (2,310,207 shares held by 10,245 shareholders; capital stock and surplus of
$14,991,5IO) came to $261,522, about equally divided between the two factions.
See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., ii6 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842-43
(Sup. Ct. X952), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 201, 132 N.Y.S.2d 273 (2d Dep't 1954), afi'd,
309 N.Y. i68, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). Doubtless sums considerably greater were
spent in such widely publicized proxy fights as those for control of the New York
Central, Montgomery Ward, and the New York, New Haven & Hartford. It is
reported that in the New York Central proxy contest management spent $340,000,
and the insurgents $3o5,ooo, on newspaper advertisements alone. The New Yorker,
July 3, 1954, P. 37.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
with certainty how far the courts will sanction such disburse-
ments- the director will have to reach into his own pocket
to replenish that till. And, although courts are certainly slow to
find negligence or misconduct where directors appear to be exer-
cising their best business judgment and do not profit personally
from the challenged transaction, it is not hard to call to mind
other situations- for example, the voting of enormous salaries
and fringe benefits to executives whose value may be more ap-
parent to the directors than to minority stockholders or judges -
in which the director must have an uneasy awareness that his
actions may be successfully challenged as waste of corporate as-
sets.
3
Moreover, a director serving what he conceives to be the best
interests of his corporation may, like any other agent, incur sub-
stantial personal liability to third persons, including the govern-
ment. Instances are not wanting in which directors, furthering
with perhaps excessive zeal the purposes of their corporation,
have found themselves the subject of criminal proceedings under
the revenue or antitrust laws.4
The director cannot safeguard himself by the simple process
of refraining from conscious wrongdoing. In the first place, there
are sizeable areas of corporation law in which it is not easy to
tell in advance what a court will regard as permissible. In the
second place, no matter how innocent the director, he will prob-
ably incur substantial counsel fees, payable win, lose, or draw, in
the course of defending himself if charges are brought.
In some jurisdictions, in recent years, legislative action has
limited the open season on directors by handicapping the more
irresponsible type of stockholder's derivative action - "strike
suits" brought by professional plaintiffs in the hope of being
3 There have been many laborers in this legal vineyard, and the literature on
stockholders' derivative actions is correspondingly voluminous. See, e.g., FLETcHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5939-6045 (rev. ed. 1932); WOOD, SURVEY
AND REPORT REGARDING STOCK3OLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944); Hornstein,
Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse -Present and Future, 41 CoLUMr. L. REv.
405 (194i); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39
CoLum. L. REV. 784, 797-98 (1939).
' A New York judge not long ago went so far as to describe antitrust prosecu-
tions as "an occupational hazard to the officers and directors of large corporations,
as truly as falling from a ladder is an occupational hazard to a painter or carpen-
ter." Van Voorhis, J., dissenting in Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 279
App. Div. 996, 998, 112 N.Y.S.2d 146, 15o (ist Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 395,
113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
[Vol. 691058













i t t i
t ti l l
t. I t t ,
,
f t l t j t i i l
f r fr i i i .
r i l r ti
tell i a a ce t rt ill r r i i l .
sec l , tt r i t t i t ,
a l i c r s st ti l s l f , l i , l , ,
t e rs f f i i lf if t.
I s j ris i ti s, i r t , l i l ti
li ited the open season irect rs i i t r
irresponsible type of st c l er's eri ati e ti - tri
suits" brought by professional plaintiffs i t e e f i
3 r l l r t re
stockholders' derivative actions is correspondingly l i s. , . ., C E ,
C CL PE I F P I P I S - (r . . ); ,
A..'lJ) REP RT REGARDING ST HOLDERS' I I I ( ); r t i ,
e l tr ls f r l tr orporate use-Present t re, I OLUM.
405 (I94I); ornstein, e sel i t l er's i tive its,
nt. . . , --g ( 39).
4 e ork judge not long ago e t s f r s t s ri titr st r cu-
tions as "an occupational hazard to the officers and directors of large corporations,
as truly as falling fro a ladder is an occupational azar t i t r r r -
ter." an oorhis, J., dissenting in c arz . e eral ili il r .,
App. Div. 996, 998, II2 . .S.2d I46, I50 (Ist ep't 1952), afJ'd, 305 . . 395,
II3 .E.2d 533 (I953).
INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
bought off.' Thus statutes may require that the plaintiff have
been a stockholder at the time of the transaction of which he com-
plains or that his stock have thereafter devolved upon him by
operation of law.' They may also require that a plaintiff whose
stock holdings aggregate less than a stated percentage of the cor-
poration's outstanding shares, or less than a stated market value,
post security for the expenses, including counsel fees, which the
corporation may incur in the action - either directly or through
an obligation to indemnify another party, such as a director who
is named as a defendant.
While such measures undoubtedly afford the director a degree
of protection against the worst of his natural enemies, they by no
means serve to set his mind completely at rest. In many states
they do not exist; even where they do, it might in hard times be
easy to find enough discontented stockholders to make up the
necessary minimum. Troublesome questions as to what stock-
holders' suits are "in the right of" the corporation, and therefore
within the scope of the statutes, add to the uncertainty. And, of
course, the statutes furnish no protection at all against criminal
sanctions or civil liabilities sought to be imposed by third persons.
5 See Fuld, J., dissenting in Gordon v. Elliman, 3o6 N.Y. 456, 479, i9 N.E.2d
331, 345-46 (1954):
The statute [N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 61-b] was aimed at a particular
and well-perceived abuse-the so-called "strike suit," brought on behalf of a
corporation against its directors or officers by persons who, since their hold-
ings are "too small to indicate legitimate personal interest in the outcome and
accordingly in the bringing of the action," realize the nuisance value of their
suits and hope to be bought off by secret settlements. . . . Actions for waste
or mismanagement were peculiarly vulnerable to that abuse.
6 E.g., Fn. R. CIV. P. 23(b); DEL. CoDE ANx. tit. 8, § 327 (1953); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 14:3-16 (Supp. 1955); N.Y. GEN. CoRi. LAW § 61; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. X2,
§ 1321 (Purdon 1953).
SE.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (Supp. i955); N.Y. GEx. CoRp. LAW § 6I-b;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Purdon 1953); WIs. STAT. § 180.405(4) (1953).
The New York and New Jersey statutes use 5% or $5o,ooo. The constitutionality
of these measures seems to be beyond question. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (949); Lapchak v. Baker, 298 N.Y. 89, 80 N.E.2d 751
(1948).
8 Thus the New York Court of Appeals recently split four to three on whether
an action against a corporation and its directors to compel the declaration of divi-
dends is brought "in the right of" the corporation, the majority holding that it is.
Gordon v. Elliman, 306 N.Y. 456, rig N.E.2d 33X (X954); cf. Lehrman v. God-
chaux Sugars, Inc., 207 Misc. 314, 138 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (action to en-
join proposed recapitalization as unfair to one class of stock is not brought "in
the right of" the corporation, so plaintiff cannot be required to post security). See
Scott, Developments in Corporate Law, The Business Lawyer, July 1955, pp. 25,
30-31.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
In these circumstances, an individual who is asked to serve on
the board of a corporation, who has no significant personal finan-
cial interest in the corporation, may well pause and ponder the
relative values of the game and the candle. The question he must
ask himself and his lawyer is: "If I get into legal trouble, can the
corporation bail me out, and must it?" The purpose of this arti-
cle is to examine some of the more recent cases and statutes which,
particularly in New York, make it so hard to give a concise and
rational answer to that question.
I. COMMON LAW
The simplest situation is that in which a director, at the suit of
a stockholder, is found derelict in the performance of his duties
to the corporation. The courts which have considered such cases
have uniformly held that such rascals cannot compound their
rascality by charging the corporation with the cost of their de-
fense.' A fortiori, they could hardly expect the corporation to re-
turn to them the amounts which they have been compelled to
repay it, even though their misconduct may have consisted not
of diverting corporate assets into their own pockets, but of per-
mitting others to profit. There seems to be no case in which
it has been asserted that indemnification under such circumstances
was authorized or required by charter, by-law, or contract. Even
in the absence of statute, it seems somewhat doubtful that a court
would find consonant with public policy a provision or agreement
which permitted or required indemnification in such circum-
stances - although a distinction might validly be drawn for such
purposes between deliberate fleecing of the corporation and acts
which, although found to be improper, were done in good faith
and not for the personal profit of the defendant director.' °
A greater variety of common-law opinion has manifested itself
with respect to the director who successfully defends himself
against charges of misfeasance. Courts in two important jurisdic-
' E.g., Hollander v. Breeze Corps., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 A.2d 507 (Ch. 1941),
aff'd per curiam, 33 N.J. Eq. 613, 26 A.2d 522 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (defendant
directors had permitted dominant president to squander corporate assets for his own
benefit); Apfel v. Auditore, 223 App. Div. 457, 228 N.Y. Supp. 489 (1st Dep't
1928), aff'd mem., 250 N.Y. 6oo, 166 N.E. 339 (1929); see Washington, Litigation
Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders' Suits, 40 CoLum. L. REv. 431, 433
(1940).
"0 See p. "o67 infra.
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INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
tions - Ohio and New York - have held that not even such an
innocent can recover his legal expenses. In 1907, in what appears
to be the earliest decision dealing with the problem, Figge v.
Bergenthal," the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said: "[I] f no case
is made against defendants it is not improper or unjust that the
corporation should pay for the defense of the action." In fact,
however, the corporation, by a resolution of the stockholders, had
elected to pay the costs of the director's defense. Thus, although
the director himself controlled the corporation, the case is not
necessarily to be regarded as a decision on his right to such in-
demnification. Twenty-four years later the Ohio Court of Appeals,
in Griesse v. Lang,'2 was faced with a situation in which directors,
victorious in a stockholder's suit against them, caused the cor-
poration to pay their legal expenses, omitting, however, to secure
the authorization of the stockholders. The court held the pay-
ment illegal, adducing as grounds both the fact that there was no
stockholder vote and its conclusion that the corporation had re-
ceived no benefit from the legal services to the defendant direc-
tors. The opinion betrays little understanding of the real prob-
lems involved. A successful defense against charges of having
wronged the corporation could rarely, if ever, amount to an affirm-
ative benefit to the corporation; and if the first ground itself
rendered the payment illegal, it is hard to see how it could have
been authorized by any vote of the stockholders short of una-
nimity.13 Several years later, a retired judge of the New York
Court of Appeals, sitting as a referee in litigation in the supreme
court, found no authority other than the Figge and Griesse cases,
elected to follow the latter, and held in New York Dock Co. v.
McCollum 11 that successful directors, absent any showing that the
corporation had benefited from their defense, were not entitled to
reimbursement of their counsel fees.' 5 More recent decisions in
13 130 Wis. 594, 625, I09 N.W. 58i, 592 (1907).
12 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931).
11 Besides distinguishing the Figge case on the ground of ratification, the Ohio
court concluded - erroneously - that the case had been overruled by Jesse v. Four
Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, X89 N.W. 276 (1922), a case in which directors
were denied indemnification for litigation expenses for the good reason that the acts
for which they had been sued (alleged fraud in inducing the sale of stock to them-
selves) had been performed in their individual capacities and had nothing to do
with the corporation.
24 173 Misc. io6, I6 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. X939).
12 In fact, there is nothing in the report of the McCollum case to indicate that
the corporation or its stockholders were willing to indemnify the directors, so the
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
other jurisdictions have, however, reached the opposite conclusion,
upholding the common-law right of a vindicated director to re-
cover from the corporation the expenses of his defense. Not long
ago a federal court of appeals, making obiter a survey of the com-
mon-law cases, concluded that the trend (if so portentous a term
may be applied to two cases) was in favor of the innocent direc-
tor's right to indemnification. 6
Even if we assume that the corporation has no legal obligation
to reimburse the directors, either because the particular jurisdic-
tion refuses to recognize such liability in any circumstances or
because the director's defense has not prevailed, we are left with
the troublesome question of the extent to which a corporation, in
the exercise of its business judgment, can elect to indemnify the
director, and the still more troublesome question of the manner in
which such corporate willingness may be manifested: by provi-
sion of charter or by-laws or other form of contract, by action of a
majority of the stockholders, or simply by resolution of the direc-
tors. The cases have not clearly illuminated the first question and
have left the second in almost total darkness.
We may start from the proposition that there should be and is
an area within which a corporation is free to indemnify a director
against expenses incurred in connection with litigation based on
alleged failure in the director's duty to the corporation, regardless
of the existence of a legal obligation to do so, just as it is normally
free, in the interest of good relations with employees, other busi-
nesses, or the public, to recognize obligations which are moral at
best, or even to make donations to charity. 7 The problem, of
Figge case may not have been germane. See Washington, supra note 9, at 442-43.
Indemnification was also refused by the New York Court of Appeals in a case
decided after the enactment of a statute dealing with the matter, but based on
transactions antedating the statute. Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 877
(Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd meM., 267 App. Div. 899, 48 N.Y.S.2d 324 (ist Dep't), aff'd
mer., 293 N.Y. 735, 56 N.E.2d 739 (1944); see Schwarz v. General Aniline &
Film Corp., 3o5 N.Y. 395, 404-05, X13 N.E.2d 533, 537 (1953) (concurring opin-
ion).
"°Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., .204 F.2d 888, 899 (3d Cir. 1953),
citing In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (I95O), and Solimine
v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (Ch. i94i).
"
7 Cf. Breay v. Royal British Nurses' Ass'n, [I897] 2 Ch. 272 (C.A.), which,
in the expansive and leisurely judicial fashion of the period, considered the right
of a corporation to indemnify a member who, in consequence of carrying out its
instructions, was personally sued for libel. Lord justice Lindley said:
Now, supposing this was not the case of a corporation, is there anything illegal
or immoral or improper in a master defending his servant, or a principal de-
fending his agent, in such a case? Absolutely nothing. Can it be said, then,
io62 [Vol. 69
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INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
course, is to delimit that area. Clearly outside such an area of dis-
cretion should be any degree of indemnification of directors who
have willfully betrayed their fiduciary obligation to the corpora-
tion - unless, perhaps, they can show, as to counsel fees, that
"some interest of the corporation was in fact threatened and that,
for that reason, the expenditure was justified . 1... 8
Assuming that a particular claim for indemnity may be, al-
though not legally enforceable, within the permissible area of
discretion, there remains the problem of the significance which
should be given to particular methods of exercising that discre-
tion. Ordinarily, a corporation exercises its business judgment
through its directors and officers. But, by the very nature of the
case, a decision of interested directors themselves to have the cor-
poration retain or pay their counsel is not entitled to the indul-
gence ordinarily shown a bona fide exercise of corporate business
judgment, and the courts appear to give it little or no weight.19
If, as is often the case, the interested directors own or control a
that this is such an unbusinesslike proceeding that we ought to draw a sharp
distinction, and say that although an ordinary individual can do it, a corpora-
tion cannot do it, even though they stand in the same position towards the
person whom they defend as an ordinary individual? That would be equivalent
to saying that a corporation cannot do in any ordinary matter of business what
everybody else conducting the same kind of business can do. That appears
to me to be a proposition which cannot be sustained.
rd. at 277.
Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., x8i App. Div. 75, 78, 68 N.Y. Supp. 251,
254 (ist Dep't x917), aff'd Mem., 227 N.Y. 656, 126 N.E. 9o8 (1920) (directors,
although held personally liable for improper disbursements, had succeeded in re-
ducing the scope of a receivership sought by plaintiff minority shareholders); cf.
Esposito v. Riverside Sand & Gravel Co., 287 Mass. i85, 187, 191 N.E. 363, 364
(1934); Kirby v. Schenck, 25 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Where, as is often the
case, the same counsel act for both the corporation and the individual defendants,
Solomon himself might have difficulty in arriving at a fair allocation of their
total fees between the corporation and the directors. Cf. Heller v. Boylan, 29
N.Y.S.2d 653, 694-96 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd Mern., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131
(1st Dep't z94i). The learned referee in the McCollum case indicated that, in his
opinion, situations in which directors could show such benefit to the corporation
as to justify its payment of their counsel fees would be exceedingly rare. 173
Misc. at iii, x6 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
" For example, in the Griesse case, in Hollander v. Breeze Corps., x31 N.J. Eq.
985, 26 A.2d 5o7 (Ch. 1941); aff'd per curan, 131 N.J. Eq. 613, 26 A.2d 522 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1942), and in Apfel v. Auditore, 223 App. Div. 457, 228 N.Y. Supp. 489
(ist Dep't 1928), aff'd Mem., 25o N.Y. 6oo, 65 N.E. 339 (1929), the defendant direc-
tors, who controlled the management of the corporations, had authorized the expendi-
tures. In all these cases the courts refused to allow the payment from corporate
funds. In each, however, the court seems to have assumed that the payment was
simply illegal, although in the Griesse case (the only one in which the directors'
defense had been successful) there is a suggestion that the result might have been
different if a majority of the stockholders had given their approval.
:1956] io63
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(1st ep't 1941). he learned referee i t e c ll i i t t t, i
opinion, situations in hich irect rs c l s s fit t t ti
as to justify its pay ent of their counsel fees l i l r r .
isc. t III, 1 . . . t .
19 For exa ple, in the riesse case, i ollander . reeze r s., 1 .J. .
585, 26 A.2d 507 (Ch. 1941)", aff'd per curiam, 131 .J. q. 613, 26 . ( t.
Err. & App. 1942), and in Apfel v. uditore, 223 pp. iv.457, 228 . . upp.
(1st Dep't 1928), aff'd me ., 250 . . 600,166 . . 339 (1929), the efe a t ir -
tors, who controlled the anage ent of the corporations, had a t rize t e i-
tures. In all these cases the courts refused to allo t e a e t fr r r t
funds. In each, ho ever, the court see s to a e ass e t t t t
si ply illegal, although i the riesse case (t e l i i t ir t rs'
defense had been successful) t ere is a s esti t t t r lt i t
different if a ajority f t e st c l ers i t ir l.
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majority of the stock, a vote by that majority should add nothing.
In such cases, the courts may have to abandon their traditional
reluctance to pass upon questions of business judgment and them-
selves decide whether indemnification is a reasonably prudent use
of corporate funds. On the other hand, a court might well fall
back on its familiar policy of nonintervention where payment of
expenses which come within the discretionary area has been ap-
proved by a majority of disinterested directors or stockholders.
There is obviously a much stronger case for indemnification if
it is provided for by some form of previous agreement between the
corporation and the director. In practice, after the disturbing
decision in the McCollum case, and before the enactment of the
legislation hereinafter discussed, many corporations amended
their charters or by-laws to authorize the reimbursement of direc-
tors for expenses incurred in successfully defending suits.20 There
appears to be no case passing squarely upon the validity of such
a provision in the absence of statute - although, if reimburse-
ment of even innocent directors for litigation expenses which
cannot be shown to have benefited the corporation is illegal at
common law, as the Griesse case said and the McCollum case
seemed to say,2 1 it is not easy to see how it could be made any
20 See Hornstein, Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits, 43 CoLUM. L. RaV.
301, 301-o2 (1943); Jervis, Corporate Agreements To Pay Directors' Expenses in
Stockholders' Suits, 40 CoLum. L. Rav. 1192 (1940). A typical amendment reads
substantially as follows:
Any person made a party to any action, suit, or proceeding by reason of the
fact that he, his testator, or intestate, is or was a director, officer, or employee
of the Corporation or of any corporation which he served as such at the re-
quest of the Corporation shall be indemnified by the Corporation against the
reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, actually and necessarily incurred
by him in connection with the defense of such action, suit, or proceeding, or in
connection with any appeal therein, except in relation to matters as to which
it shall be adjudged in such action, suit, or proceeding that such officer, director,
or employee is liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his
duties.
The foregoing right of indemnification shall not be deemed exclusive of any
other rights to which such officer, director, or employee may he entitled apart
from the provisions of this section.
The amount of indemnity to which any officer or director may be entitled
shall he fixed by the board of directors, except that in any case where there is
no disinterested majority of the board available the amount shall be fixed by
arbitration pursuant to the then existing rules of the American Arbitration As-
sociation.
21 A later New York common-law decision, however, added the significant -
qualification "in the absence of contract" to the statement that a director who
successfully defends against a derivative action cannot require the corporation to
reimburse him. Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (Sup. Ct.
1943), aff'd Mner., 267 App. Div. 899, 48 N.Y.S.2d 324 (ist Dep't), aff'd mnem.,
293 N.Y. 735, 56 N.E.2d 739 (1944). Presumably the word "contract" was intended
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less so by a charter or by-laws provision passed by a vote of a
mere majority of the stockholders.
The foregoing should sufficiently demonstrate that at common
law the extent of a director's right to indemnity for expenses in-
curred in the defense of actions by or on behalf of the corporation
is highly uncertain. Is he any better off when he is sued by third
persons for an alleged tort or breach of contract committed in the
course of his duties? Rules which are clearer in principle apply
to his right to indemnity in such circumstances, but a reading of
the cases, even when statutory complications are put to one side,
leaves one in some doubt as to the practical value of his remedies,
should the corporation refuse to reimburse him.22
When a director acts for his corporation in dealing with out-
siders, the relationship between him and the corporation is that
of principal and agent. It is well established that there is an im-
plied promise on the part of a principal to indemnify his agent
for losses which are the "direct and natural consequence of the
execution of the agency" - including not only counsel fees ex-
pended in litigation based on such acts, but damages which an
agent acting in good faith may be compelled to pay third persons
upon a determination that his conduct was wrongful.23 The rule
should be no less applicable because the principal happens to be a
corporation and the agent one of its directors or officers; and in
fact it has frequently been stated, though not so frequently ap-
plied, where the principal and the agent bore these characters. 24
to include a charter or by-law provision. Cf. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film
Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 404-05, 113 N.E.2d 533, 537 (1953) (concurring opinion).
22 It is probable that in most cases in which the allegedly wrongful acts were
done by the individual in the ordinary course of business, so that the interests of
the corporation are directly involved, the corporation will be willing to reimburse
the individual for expenses which he has borne, and no litigation will result. See
New York Law Revision Commission, Report, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65 (E), at 20
(1945). There is no doubt as to the propriety of reimbursement in such circum-
stances. See p. xo67 infra.
23 3 MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 1603-04 (2d ed. 1914); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 1439,
comment f (1933). The stammvater of the American line of cases is D'Arcy v.
Lyle, 5 Binn. 441 (Pa. 1813), in which the principal was compelled to reimburse
the agent for a sum which the latter had been compelled to pay "by the cruel
order of an inexorable [foreign] tyrant . . . ." Id. at 452. The rule is applicable
where the agreement between principal and agent does not contemplate the per-
formance of acts which the agent knows, or ought to know, would be illegal or
tortious. Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 498-99 (1893); Horrabin v. Des Moines,
198 Iowa 549, i99 N.W. 988 (1924); Howe v. Buffalo, N.Y. & E.R.R., 37 N.Y. 297
(1867).2 4 See, e.g., Standard Galvanizing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 736 (7th Cir.
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The difficulty, of course, is to apply the rule to particular situa-
tions - specifically, to find a causal connection between the au-
thorized execution of the agency and whatever legal difficulty the
agent gets into. It is probably merely coincidence that in the two
principal cases in which directors have sought to invoke the rule
against reluctant corporate principals, the courts have refused to
find such a connection. In Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co.,25 the
plaintiff, who was chairman of the defendant's board of directors,
was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the Government in the fil-
ing of the corporation's income tax returns. Having been tried
and acquitted, he sued the corporation to recover the fees he had
paid to the eminent and expensive counsel who defended him. Al-
though he alleged his innocence and his acquittal, the court
seized on his failure to allege specifically that the returns were
correct (or at least honest) as ground for a holding that the com-
plaint did not show the plaintiff's prosecution to be a direct and
natural consequence of the execution of his agency which was to
file proper returns. In Hock v. Duluth Brewing & Malting Co.,26
the plaintiff, who was the president and a director of the defend-
ant corporation, took title to certain land as security for a debt
owed the corporation. Many years later, after the debt had been
paid and the land reconveyed, the United States, asserting that the
original patent to the land had been secured by fraud, brought a
civil action for damages against everyone in the chain of title, in-
cluding the plaintiff. The Government was nonsuited, and the
plaintiff attempted to recover his counsel fees from the corpora-
tion. Again, the court refused to find a causal relation between the
execution of the agency and the agent's loss- this time on the
ground that the loss was caused by "the independent and unex-
pected wrongful act of the United States, for which the defendant
was in nowise responsible." 27 The correctness of both of these
decisions is open to serious question; 28 but there they are, and the
1953), Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co., 288 Fed. 583 (W.D. Pa. X923); Hoch v.
Duluth Brewing & Malting Co., 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 5o3 (1928).
25 288 Fed. 583 (W.D. Pa. 1923).
26 173 Minn. 374, 2x7 N.W. 5o3 (1928).
2 7 Id. at 378, 217 N.W. at 504.
28 The cases seem to go on a theory that the third party's suit must be a probable
and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the agency, rather than merely a
direct consequence. Carried to its logical extreme, this reasoning would lead to the
result that a completely innocent agent can never be entitled to indemnification.
In D'Arcy v. Lyle, 5 Binn. 441 (Pa. x813), a favorite of the Emperor Christophe of
Haiti asserted an unjust claim against the principal, which the agent was compelled
a
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raised eyebrows of legal commentators are not likely to offer
much reassurance to a corporate director who finds himself in a
similar situation.
On the other hand, in the absence of fraud, there would seem
to be little reason for a court to upset a corporation's voluntary
decision to indemnify a director against the cost of defending
and, if need be, settling or satisfying a judgment in a suit by a
third party based on acts performed by the director within the
scope of his authority and on the corporation's behalf; and the
few cases which have considered the matter have taken this view.
One New York case, in fact, upheld, against the complaint of a
minority stockholder, the corporation's decision to finance the
unsuccessful defense of some of its officers and directors in a
criminal antitrust proceeding and even its decision to pay the fines
of two who had pleaded nolo contendere.2 9 The court did so,
however, not by applying the indemnification rule of the law of
agency, but by reasoning that the interests of the individual de-
fendants and the corporation (which was also a defendant) were
so closely bound up that the corporation defended itself in de-
fending them. In a recent tax case, a federalcourt of appeals
concluded that payment of a corporate officer's expenses in pend-
ing litigation arising out of his. activity as the corporation's agent
in floating a loan was a proper business expense, on the theory
that otherwise the director might very well sue the corpora-
tion on the agency theory and at least force the corporation to
pay expensive fees in the defense even if it were successful. 30
It should be noted that the ordinary chartei or by-laws provi-
sions for indemnification may complicate rather than simplify the
director's problem, so far as third-party litigation is concerned.
Although aimed at suits based on asserted wrongs to the corpora-
to pay under threat of trial by combat. The agent recovered from the principal,
which he certainly could not have done on the reasoning of the Hoch and Du Puy
cases.
2 9 Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (ist Dep't 1944). The
court said that by the individual defendants' pleas of noto contendere, "a valuable
consideration moved from the defendants to the corporation, and the corporation
clearly benefited thereby," id. at 206, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 275, perhaps because the pleas
facilitated a more advantageous settlement of some of the charges against the
corporation itself. See also Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics, Inc., 256
App. Div. 134, 539, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415, 420 (4th Dep't), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 840, 25
N.E.2d 887 (5939)'.
'0 Standard Galvanizing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1953).
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tion, the language of these provisions (e.g., "any person made a
party to any action, suit, or proceeding by reason of the fact that
he . . . is or was a director, officer, or employee of the Corpora-
tion . . ,, 31) may be broad enough to cover also suits based on
allegedly wrongful acts committed in the corporation's behalf
and in the course of the director's duties; and practically all such
provisions either in substance except from their scope expenses in
connection with an action in which the director is adjudged guilty
of negligence or misconduct, or affirmatively prohibit indemnifica-
tion in such a case. This is fair enough where the director is found
to have been delinquent in his duties to the corporation; but it may
be most unfair in the third-party situation. Suppose, for example,
that an officer who has diligently and in good faith implemented
a corporate policy which turns out to be a violation of the anti-
trust laws, finds himself, as a result, liable for a substantial fine
and an even more substantial lawyer's bill. He has been adjudged
guilty of misconduct vis-i-vis the Government, but not as to his
corporation. If there were no indemnity provision in its charter,
the corporation would probably be free to pay his counsel fees
and even his fine, certainly if its interests were so closely related
to his that it could be said itself to derive benefit from his de-
fense.32 It could persuasively be argued that, since he acted as
the corporation's agent for the performance of acts which he did
not know to be illegal and which were not manifestly so, the cor-
poration is under an obligation to make him whole. But if the
charter explicitly prohibits indemnification for expenses in con-
nection with an action in which the officer is held liable, indemnifi-
cation might be ultra vires. Most such provisions also state in
substance that the right of indemnification which they confer is
not exclusive of any other right which the director may have in a
court of law. Such a proviso may save whatever rights the direc-
tor may have under the law of agency; but if those rights are
based on a theory of implied contract the implication of such a
contract is assuredly not facilitated by an express provision to the
contrary in the corporate articles or by-laws.
II. STATUTORY REGULATION
The first part of this article should make it clear that the com-
mon law governing a director's right to indemnification for costs
31 See note 20 supra.
"
2 See Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), affd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (ist Dep't 1944).
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of litigation is a welter of confusion. After the McCollum case
had, as it were, focused the confusion, there was a not unnatural
cry for legislation. So far, about a third of the states have heeded
that cry.3 The trouble is that the director's lawyer who turns
to an examination of these statutes, and the cases construing
them, may find two new uncertainties for every old one that has
been laid to rest.
Basically, the statutes are of two types, although they present
a somewhat bewildering variety of detail. The commoner type
simply provides that the corporation shall have power to in-
demnify in certain cases, or that it may, by action of its stock-
holders, make such provision in its charter or by-laws; 31 the
others grant to directors, officers, or employees a right to in-
demnification in certain cases.35 New York is one of a small num-
ber of states which have both types. Because the New York stat-
utes, 36 constituting article 6-A of the General Corporation Law,
are fairly typical and because recent decisions of the courts have
raised some difficult questions under them, this article is con-
centrated on the law of that state.
The operative provisions of the statutes are set forth in two
sections. Section 63 authorizes the indemnification by the cor-
poration of directors, officers, and employees for expenses in-
curred in defending against actions brought by reason of their
corporate office, unless they are adjudged liable for negligence or
misconduct in the performance of their duties; the indemnification
may be provided for by the certificate of incorporation, an amend-
ment to that certificate, another certificate filed pursuant to law,
the by-laws, or a resolution in a specific case. The right is not
exclusive of other rights apart from the statute.3 7 Section 64
33 The statutes are comprehensively and competently surveyed in Corament,
52 MICH. L. REv. 1023 (1954).
E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (I9g3); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14:3-14
(Supp. 1944).
"E.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 830 (Deering 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1323 (Purdon 1953).
31 N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 63-68.
" Section 63 provides in part:
The certificate of incorporation of a corporation or, when adopted by a
vote of the holders of record of a majority of the outstanding shares at the
time entitled to vote for the election of directors . . . a certificate of amend-
ment to the certificate of incorporation, or other certificate filed pursuant to
law, or the by-laws, or a resolution in a specific case, may provide that any
person made a party to any action, suit or proceeding by reason of the fact
that he, his testator or intestate, is or was a director, officer or employee of the
corporation or of any corporation which he served as such at the request of
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supplements the previous section by providing a right to have the
expenses assessed against the corporation.3 Section 67 then de-
fines the extent of the court's jurisdiction to award expenses. 9
The extent to which the provisions of section 63 limit the free-
dom of a corporation to provide for indemnification is very far
from clear. A majority of the New York Court of Appeals re-
cently said that the section is a "regulation of the exercise of a
common-law right of freedom of contract and is merely declara-
tory thereof"; 40 but the Attorney General of New York has ruled
that a charter provision which provides a broader right of in-
demnification than that spelled out in section 63 cannot be filed.41
This ruling appears questionable in the light of the decision in
Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.4 2 The court of appeals
held in that case that the words "any action, suit or proceeding"
in section 64 do not include a criminal action. But a majority of
the court also stated very explicitly that the corporation was free
the corporation, shall be indemnified by the corporation against the reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, actually and necessarily incurred by him in
connection with the defense of such action, suit or proceeding, or in connection
with any appeal therein, except in relation to matters as to which it shall be
adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding that such officer, director or em-
ployee is liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties.
Such right of indemnification shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights
to which such director, officer or employee may be entitled apart from this
statute.
3s Section 64 provides:
Any person made a party to any action, suit or proceeding by reason of the
fact that he, his testator or intestate, is or was a director, officer or employee
of a corporation shall be entitled to have his reasonable expenses, including at-
torneys' fees, actually and necessarily incurred by him in connection with the
defense of such action, suit or proceeding, and in connection with any appeal
therein, assessed against the corporation or against another corporation at the
request of which he served as such director, officer or employee, upon court
order . . . except in relation to matters as to which it shall be adjudged in
such action, suit or proceeding that such officer, director or employee is liable
for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties.3 9 In essence, the court must find that the applicant has been successful in
whole or in part, or that the action has been settled with the approval of the
court; and it can make no award if indemnification is inconsistent with the law
of the state of incorporation, or any action of stockholders antedating and effective
at the time of the accrual of the alleged cause of action, or any condition imposed
by the court in connection with a court-approved settlement.
40 Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 405, 113 N.E.2d 533,
537 (1953) (concurring opinion).41 N.Y. Ar'y GEr. Am. REP. 182 (1953). The charter in question would
have authorized indemnification for expenses incurred in a settlement not bl6ssed
with court approval and would have excepted only cases in which the director or
officer was adjudged guilty of "wilful misfeasance or malfeasance in the perform-
ance of his duties," rather than the statutory formula of "negligence or miscon-
duct."
42 3o5 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
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to authorize reimbursement in its charter or by-laws "and to in-
clude specifically not only civil but criminal actions." 48 Unless
we are to suppose that the court interpreted the words "any
action, suit or proceeding" to include criminal actions in one sec-
tion, but to exclude such actions in the very next section, enacted
at the same time, we can only conclude that the court of appeals,
unlike the Attorney General, thinks a corporation can contract
for a broader right of indemnity than that specified in section 63.
Moreover, such a contract would seem to be sanctioned by that
section's provision that "such right of indemnification shall not
be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which such director
. . . may be entitled apart from this statute." Former section
27-a of the General Corporation Law,44 which section 63 was
supposed to refine and improve, saved "any other rights to which
he [a director] may be entitled, under any by-law, agreement,
vote of stockholders or otherwise." However anomalous may be
a statutory recognition of the possibility of indemnity provisions
broader than those which the statute was thought necessary affirm-
atively to sanction, that seems to be the plain intent of the clause.
And the substitution of the very broad phrase "apart from this
statute" could hardly have been intended to narrow the scope of
the saving clause.
If it were thought that a corporation's freedom to contract for
the indemnification of directors is comprised within the four cor-
ners of section 63, serious problems might be posed. Not, to be
sure, with respect to expenses in connection with actions by or on
behalf of the corporation, for a wrong to it. In such cases, the
statutory limitation-no reimbursement "in relation to matters
as to which it shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding
that such officer, director or employee is liable for negligence or
misconduct in the performance of his duties" -is essentially
consistent with the policy adopted by most corporations prior to
the statute and with sound public policy. A caveat may perhaps
be entered as to the situation in which the director's defense, al-
though unsuccessful, has incidentally benefited the corporation,
"I In the concurring opinion of Carswell, J., in which the other members of
the majority concurred. Id. at 405, 113 N.E.2d at 537. However, it is reported
that the New York Secretary of State, acting on the advice of the Attorney General,
will not accept for filing a charter provision which authorizes indemnification for
expenses in connection with criminal actions. See Scott,-Developments in Corporate
Law, The Business Lawyer, July 1955, p. 33 n.5.
"' N.Y. Sess. Laws 1941, c. 209, § 1.
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as by avoiding or limiting the scope of receivership; 45 it is doubt-
ful whether section 63 would sanction any reimbursement in such
a situation, unless it could be argued that such aspects of the
litigation, i.e., those which may adversely affect the corporation
unless successfully defended against by the director, are distinct
from matters as to which the director may be adjudged liable. The
language of the exception, when read in conjunction with section
65, which permits application to the courts for reimbursement
under a charter or by-law provision, and section 67, which per-
mits the court to make an award if the applicant was successful
"in whole or in part," seems clearly to permit differentiation be-
tween charges as to which a director is held liable and other
charges in the same litigation as to which he is exonerated.
46
Potential complications under section 63 arise from the possi-
bility of its application to suits, not by or on behalf of the cor-
poration, for wrongs to third parties committed by the director or
officer in the authorized execution of his duties to the corpora-
tion. Although the juxtaposition of article 6-A to article 6, which
deals entirely with breach of the director's duties to the corpora-
tion, shows clearly enough that the legislature was concerned
primarily with the latter type of proceeding,4 7 the language of the
" Cf. Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., I81 App. Div. 75, i68 N.Y. Supp. 25,
(ist Dep't I917), aff'd iner., 227 N.Y. 656, x26 N.E. 9o8 (192o), and other cases
cited note i8 supra.
46 Cf. Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 8og, 814 (Sup. Ct.
I952). However, a decision of the New York Supreme Court under former § 6i-a
of the General Corporation Law, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1941, c. 350, § I (the forerunner
of present § 64), refused to assess against the corporation any part of the counsel
fees of directors who had been largely, but not entirely, successful in their defense,
even though that statute explicitly provided that if such parties should be suc-
cessful only in part their expenses should be assessed against the corporation in
whatever amount the court thought reasonable. Drivas v. Lekas, i82 Misc. 567,
48 N.Y;S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1944). The court apparently proceeded on the theory
that the statute did not entitle even wholly successful defendant directors to re-
imbursement unless they could show benefit to the corporation. The present stat-
utes at least make clear that such benefit is not a condition precedent to an innocent
director's right to indemnity.
41 See New York Law Revision Commission, Report, LEois. Doc. No. 65 (E),
at 2o (1945):
Directors, officers or employees of corporations may, by virtue of their office
or employment, be named as defendants in various sorts of actions or pro-
ceedings. Broadly speaking, these are of two types: (i) where it is sought to
hold an official liable personally or with the corporation for something done
or omitted to be done in the course of his duty; (2) where the gravamen of the
action or proceeding is something done or omitted to be done which, it is
claimed, was not in the ordinary course of business and therefore constitutes
a breach of duty to the corporation, to stockholders, or perhaps to govern-
mental authority.
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INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
statute draws no distinction between the two types of litigation
and, indeed, specifically applies to one sort of third-party action:
that which results from service, at the request of the corporation,
as a director, officer, or employee of another corporation. A stand-
ard which is appropriate where the corporation itself is the ag-
grieved party, i.e., no indemnification if the director is adjudged
liable for misconduct in the performance of his duties, is not well
adapted to a situation in which the action complained of not only
was not directed against the corporation, but was taken for its
benefit and under its authority. There are as yet no cases in-
volving the application of section 63 to situations in which a direc-
tor, although found liable to third persons, is yet guilty of no
dereliction in his duties to his corporation. It may reasonably be
doubted that it was the intention of the legislature to preclude
reimbursement in circumstances like those of Simon v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. 48 or Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co.;49 but it is to
be feared that the legislature's failure clearly to limit section 63
to the type of litigation covered by article 6 - that which is based
on derelictions of duty to the corporation -has considerably
muddied the waters.
Similar questions, in possibly more acute form, present them-
selves under section 64.50 Unlike section 63, it contains no provi-
In actions of the first type, it would seem that if individual defendants are
required in the first instance to assume the expenses of their own defense, the
corporation may properly reimburse them. We are here concerned with actions
or proceedings of the second type.
The commentator's mention of a breach of duty to governmental authority
probably had reference to failure to comply with the corporation laws. A violation
of the antitrust or revenue laws would appear tQ belong in his first category, for
the director can hardly be said to have any fiduciary obligation to the government
and certainly is not seeking indemnification from it.
48 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.- 1942), aff'd MrnM., 267 App. Div.
890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (ist Dep't x944). See p. xo67 supra.
49 288 Fed. 583 (W.D. Pa. 1923). See p. io66 supra.
5 This provision appears in terms to be mandatory; i.e., if a defendant direc-
tor meets its requirements, a court has no discretion to refuse to assess against the
corporation his reasonable expenses, even where his moral right to indemnification
is far from clear. See Austrian v. Williams, 12o F. Supp. 90o, 904-06 (S.D.N.Y.
,953), rev'd in part on other grounds, 216 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 953 (1955) (expenses awarded where there was "more than probable
cause" for bringing suit against directors, who escaped liability "only because of the
Statute of Limitations"). On the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals has
since held tantamount to an adjudication of a defendant director's misconduct
under § 64 a dismissal of a stockholder's complaint on the sole ground that the
plaintiff was estopped by her own participation with the defendant in a conspiracy
to mulct the corporation. Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 12o N.E.2d 819
(i9s4). Three judges dissented.
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sion saving whatever rights the director might have independently
of the statute; like section 63, its language draws no distinction
between suits in the right of the corporation and suits by third
parties.51 Moreover, the fact that the impact of its predecessor,
former section 6i-a,52 was limited in terms to suits "brought by
the corporation, or brought in its behalf by a receiver or trustee
or by one or more stockholders or creditors or officers or directors
of such corporation" might ground an argument that the broaden-
ing of the language was intended to comprehend third-party suits.
More probably, however, the change is attributable to the fact
that, whereas section 64 relates only to a defendant's right to in-
demnification, section 6i-a also governed the right of a success-
ful plaintiff to have his expenses paid out of the corporate fisc
and so had to be particular in its description of eligible parties
plaintiff. 53
While the ambiguity of the language of section 64 may be
explained away, as yet no one seems to have suggested that the
section is inapplicable to the third-party situation. A case in point
is Sckwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., the facts of which
closely paralleled those of the Simon case. The Government had
secured an indictment, under section i of the' Sherman Act,55 of
the corporation and a number of its officers and directors, includ-
ing Schwarz. Schwarz, maintaining his innocence, retained per-
sonal counsel. After substantial legal expenses had been incurred,
he accepted his counsel's advice to curtail further expenses by
pleading nolo contendere and was fined $500. Upon application to
the corporation for reimbursement of his expenses, he was told
that the corporation did not "feel authorized to do so without an
order of the court." 56 Subsequently he applied to the supreme
court for an order assessing expenses under article 6-A; it does not
seem to have occurred to either party that the corporation might
" The application of the equivalent Pennsylvania statute is limited to suits
brought in the right of the corporation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1321-23 (Purdon
1953). But the California statute seems to be explicitly applicable to third-party
actions - and it is, also explicitly, exclusive. CAL. CoP. CODE ANN. § 830
(Deering 1953).
52 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1941, C. 350, § z.
" See New York Law Revision Commission, Report, LzGIs. Doc. No. 65 (E),
at 31 (1945).
54 3o5 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
55 26 STAT. 209 (i8go), as amended, z5 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
58 305 N.Y. at 398-99, 113 NXE.2d at 534.
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be empowered, not to say obligated, to reimburse him on the com-
mon-law doctrine that a principal is bound to reimburse his agent
for losses resulting from the execution of the agency. Both lowei
courts refused the order on the ground that Schwarz had been
adjudged liable for "misconduct in the performance of his
duties." )5
The court of appeals found it unnecessary to decide whether a
plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to an adjudication of mis-
conduct; it threw the case out on the ground - probably correct,
as far as it went -that the legislature had not intended article
6-A to apply to criminal proceedings. But it seems to have held
such proceedings outside the scope of article 6-A not because they
were third-party proceedings, but because they were criminal,
whereas "the Legislature was thinking of, and legislating about,
civil causes only." " The inference is that the result might have
been quite different if Schwarz had run up his legal bills in a civil
antitrust proceeding. 9 Nowhere either in the opinions of the
lower courts or in those of the majority or dissent in the court of
appeals is there any suggestion that the plaintiff might have had
a common-law remedy which was neither dependent upon nor
limited by article 6-A. It is true that the courts were under no
obligation to pass upon a contention which the pleadings failed
to raise, and the actual holding of the court of appeals is limited
to the statement that "court-mandated reimbursement, under
article 6-A, can never be had as to expenses of one defending him-
self against criminal charges ... ." 60 Nevertheless, the case is
all too likely to be cited for the broad proposition that a director
has no right to recover from the corporation the expenses of de-
fending himself against criminal charges, and it is likely to dis-
tract the attention of directors and counsel from the theory upon
which recovery in such cases ought to be predicated: that the
director, as the corporation's agent for the carrying out of poli-
cies, not manifestly illegal, nor known to the director to be so,
57 X98 Misc. 1046, 1047, 102 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (Sup. Ct. x9gi), aff'd MernM., 279.
App. Div. 996, 112 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Ist Dep't 1952).
58 305 N.Y. at 402, 113 N.E.2d at 536.
" Or so the three dissenting judges thought when they said that "the basic
flaw in the majority's reasoning . . . stems from a faulty assumption of an essen-
tial difference between the criminal and the civil in the area of antitrust regula-
tion." Id. at 410, 113 N.E.2d at 540.
" Id. at 403, 153 N.E.2d at 536.
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which got it and him into trouble with the Government, is entitled
to be made whole by his principal.
The Schwarz case raised, and ultimately left unanswered, an-
other serious question: the meaning of the statutory words "negli-
gence or misconduct in the performance of his duties." To revert
to the example given at the beginning of this article, the authoriza-
tion of campaign expenses incurred in the course of a proxy fight,
a careful reading of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opin-
ions in Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp. 61 should
convince any observer that a thoroughly upright director, con-
sulting learned counsel at every step, may yet find himself liable
for failure to comply with the exasperatingly vague standards laid
down in that case:
In a contest over policy, as compared to a purely personal power
contest, corporate directors have the right to make reasonable and
proper expenditures, subject to the scrutiny of the courts when
duly challenged, from the corporate treasury for the purpose of
persuading the stockholders of the correctness of their position and
soliciting their support for policies which the directors believe, in
all good faith, are in the best interests of the corporation. 62
Let us put ourselves in the position of A and B, incumbent direc-
tors of a corporation with a seductive surplus, faced with a chal-
lenge by C, who wants to control the corporation. C, via direct
mail solicitation, newspaper ads, and any other techniques he can
afford, promises higher dividends to the stockholding electorate
and denounces A and B as mossbacks. A and B sincerely believe
that C is a pirate whose only objective is to drain the surplus into
his own pockets. In alarm, they reply by hiring costly public
relations counsel and bombarding the stockholders with counter-
propaganda. Is this a "contest over policy" or a "purely personal
power contest"? The "policies" as against "personalities" test
seems nearly meaningless; no one seeking to overturn existing
management would identify himself with its policies. Is a full-
page, or a quarter-page, newspaper ad a "reasonable and proper"
expenditure? A television broadcast? The answers lie in the
womb of future "judicial scrutiny." The point is that, although
it is quite possible that a court will ultimately find some of A's
and B's expenditures improper, A and B, acting in the sincere
81 309 N.Y. I68, 128 N.E.2d 291 (I955).
62 Id. at i73, 128 N.E.2d at 293.
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INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
belief that the expenditures are necessary to avert corporate
catastrophe, are certainly not guilty of negligence or misconduct,
in any ordinary sense of those terms. 3 They cannot, surely, be
termed negligent for inability to peer far enough into the Fair-
child decision's crystal ball. By hypothesis, they acted in what
they conceived to be the corporation's best interest. Even if they
cannot be altogether relieved from liability, 4 they ought at least
to recover the counsel fees which they have expended in litigating
the question of propriety.
In this welter of uncertainty, corporations and their directors
may deem it prudent to consider express contracts of indemnifica-
tion, covering expenses in connection with criminal proceedings
and actions by third parties which are based on the individual's
authorized performance of an act, not known to be illegal nor
manifestly so, in the course of his duties, and excluding only
matters as to which he is adjudged liable for negligence or will-
ful misconduct in the performance of his duties to the corpora-
tion. Such a contract, as to third-party actions, would do no more
than put into writing the implied contract which the common law
considers to exist between principal and agent. There appears to
be no case striking down such a contract and, despite the anomaly
inherent in permitting a corporation to do by simple contract
what, according to the Attorney General of New York,65 it could
not do by an amendment to its charter, approved by its stock-
holders, the saving clause in section 63 and the above-quoted dicta
in the Schwarz case are strong indications that such a contract
would be upheld.
63See Van Voorhis, J., dissenting from the appellate division's decision in
the Schwarz case, 279 App. Div. at 998, X12 N.Y.S.2d at 149-5o: "The term 'mis-
conduct' as employed in section 64 of the General Corporation Law . . . refers
to something done with wrongful intent in derogation of the interests of the cor-
poration."
64 Cf. Companies Act, 1948, il & 12 Gao. 6, c. 38, § 448(i), which provides
that:
(i) If in any proceeding for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of
trust against an officer of a company . . . it appears to the court hearing the
case that that officer . . . is or may be liable in respect of the negligence, de-
fault, breach of duty or breach of trust, but that he has acted honestly and
reasonably, and that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, in-
cluding those connected with his appointment, he ought fairly to be excused
for the negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, that court may
relieve him, either wholly or partly, from his liability on such terms as the
court may think fit.
Companies Act, 1948, ix & 12 Gao. 6, c. 38, § 455(x) defines "officer" to include a
"director, manager or secretary."
6 5 N.Y. ATr' GFi. ANN. REP. 182 (1953). See note 41 supra.
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Reinforcement for this view is found in the opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Mooney
v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc.,66 applying -the law of Delaware.
The Delaware statute 67 is one of those which specifically confer
upon corporations power to indemnify directors and officers
against the expense of successfully defending litigation, without
specifying any particular method of exercising the power. It
also provides that "such indemnification shall not be deemed
exclusive of any other rights to which those indemnified may be
entitled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or
otherwise." Willys had a by-law, cast in somewhat broader terms
than the statute. Mooney, the corporation's president, entered
into a contract with it, terminating his employment and settling
various claims against it, which provided, inter alia, that the com-
pany would indemnify him for his expenses in connection with a
then-pending minority stockholders' suit in which he was named
as a defendant. When Mooney, having secured the dismissal of
the complaint against him, passed on to the corporation his law-
yer's bill, the corporation rejected his claim, arguing that Mooney
had not been sued by reason of having been an officer of Willys
but for wrongful acts as a controlling stockholder; that he was
therefore not within the class of persons to whom indemnity might
be given under the Delaware statute and Willys' by-law; that the
statute and by-law controlled claims for indemnity to the ex-
clusion of all other arrangements; and that the contract, if it
gave a broader right of indemnification than the by-law, was
ultra vires. But the court said:
Broadly speaking, the matter of indemnification of corporate offi-
cers and directors for litigation expenses is one with which the
numerous share-holding member [sic] of the public and the state
and federal regulatory- agencies are properly concerned. But that
concern is with the types of corporate employees and advisors who
are made indemnifiable, and with the extent to which indemnifica-
tion is carried, e.g., should it extend to settlements, or to any cases
in which the persons seeking indemnification are found liable? We
think that Delaware Corporation Law § 2(io) and Willys' By-Law
XXIII have met the requirements of public policy by the realistic
limits they set upon the right of indemnification. We do not think
that public policy requires that the Delaware statute be construed
66 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953).
67 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (I953).
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67 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953).
INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
as controlling every conceivable situation which in one aspect may
be called indemnification for litigation expenses, any more than the
policy of ultra vires should be applied to invalidate those other pay-
ments under the contract which, except for the contract, would be
gifts. Where there exists, as there does here, an independent
ground for the payment of litigation expenses, we see no reason to
make an overriding reference to the statute ...
We see no danger here of encouraging non-meritorious claims
for indemnification outside the by-law and the statute. An inde-
pendent legal ground . ..must be shown in every case. 8
The last-quoted paragraph leaves one in some doubt as to what
the court would have done had the litigation involved, and the
contract provided for, reimbursement for the costs of an unsuc-
cessful defense. The reference to meeting the requirements of
public policy by setting realistic limits on the right to indemnifi-
cation seems to imply that the court might have voided, as against
public policy, an agreement to reimburse a director who had been
adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct. 9 But the reference
to the possibility of showing an "independent legal ground" for a
claim outside the scope of the statute reopens the question. The
practical importance of the ambiguity is probably not great. The
case did not involve, and the court clearly did not have in mind,
litigation by third parties based on allegedly wrongful acts in the
corporation's behalf; and it is primarily in that situation that a
corporation might be morally or legally obligated to reimburse a
director whose defense was unsuccessful.
In general, it may be said that, at least in New York, corporate
directors who have reason to anticipate involvement in the factual
situations discussed in this article will do well not to place too
much reliance upon the statutory panacea. At least until such
time as a coherent pattern of judicial decision begins to manifest
itself, or the legislature tinkers further with article 6-A, the di-
rector's best protection, will probably continue to lie in carefully
drawn charter or by-law provisions, perhaps supplemented in
special cases by ad hoc contracts.
s 204 F.2d at 896.
" Cf. Companies Act, 1948, x1 & 12 (io. 6, c. 38, § 205, which in substance
makes void any charter or contract provision purporting to indemnify an officer or
director against liability based on "negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of
trust of which he may be guilty in relation to the company." On the problem of
indemnification against liability under the various federal statutes regulating securi-
ties, see Loss, SEcUnsniEs REGuLATiON io89 (191x).
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68 204 F.2d at 896.
69 j. i s t, , II BEO. , . , , i i t
s i rt r r tr t r i i ti t i if i
ir t r i st li ilit s li , f lt, r f t r r f
tr st f ic e a ilt i relati t t ." t r l f
inde nification against liability under the various fe eral stat tes re lati s ri-
ties, see ss, S C RITI S U I 10 ( 51).
